ABSTRACT. We introduce a tractable method for measuring ambiguity attitudes, which requires only three observations and five minutes per subject, and we apply this method in a large representative sample. In addition to ambiguity aversion, we confirm a-insensitivity, a new ambiguity component recently found in laboratory studies. A-insensitivity means that people insufficiently discriminate between different levels of likelihood, often treating all likelihoods as fifty-fifty, which results in the overweighting of extreme events. Our ambiguity measurements can predict real economic decisions of the subjects; specifically a-insensitivity has a negative relation with stock market participation and private business ownership. Surprisingly, ambiguity aversion is not significantly related to stock market participation, except under high ambiguity perception. Reference dependence can explain our findings, and provides a promising direction for future research on ambiguity.
Introduction
Despite the economic relevance of ambiguity (unknown probabilities), few empirical papers have studied the ambiguity attitudes of the general population, and there is little direct evidence on the relation between ambiguity attitudes and actual economic decisions. This paper develops a simple and tractable method for measuring ambiguity attitudes, requiring only three indifferences per subject. We apply our method to a large representative sample from the general population, paying €7,650 in real incentives to the subjects.
Besides ambiguity aversion, we find another relevant component of ambiguity attitudes: a-insensitivity (ambiguity-generated likelihood insensitivity). Ainsensitivity implies that people do not sufficiently discriminate between different levels of ambiguity, transforming subjective likelihoods towards fifty-fifty. This leads to ambiguity seeking for low likelihoods, whereas it enhances ambiguity aversion for high likelihoods. As a result, people overweight extreme events. For example, an entrepreneur who is a-insensitive may be willing to accept the high uncertainty of starting a new business, because he overweights the unlikely event of success. Previous studies have demonstrated a-insensitivity among students in laboratory experiments. Our study is the first to demonstrate this component of ambiguity attitudes among the general population.
We then test whether the measured ambiguity attitudes can explain real-world economic decisions. Specifically, we test whether ambiguity attitudes can help to explain the non-participation puzzle: Many households do not participate in the stock market, which cannot be explained by standard portfolio choice models (Heaton and Lucas 1997; Merton 1969; Samuelson 1969) . We find that a-insensitivity contributes to the explanation. Surprisingly, ambiguity aversion, if measured the traditional way, does not contribute significantly for the full population. Ambiguity aversion has a significant negative relation with stock market participation only for those subjects who perceive stock returns to be very ambiguous. These results can be explained by reference dependent generalizations of existing theories of ambiguity. All results are robust to controlling for education, financial assets, income, age, family structure, risk aversion, trust, and financial literacy.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literature.
Section 3 shows that, contrary to common thinking, subjective probabilities can accommodate the Ellsberg paradox. Section 4 presents an efficient tool to analyze ambiguity, matching probabilities, and discusses their main characteristics. Two convenient indexes of ambiguity attitudes can be derived from matching probabilities ( §5). The novelty of § §4-5 concerns the simplicity of measurement. Observing three matching probabilities, obtained in five minutes per subject, suffices to give the two indexes. Section 6 provides a theoretical foundation for our measurement method.
Sections 7-8 present our experiment, and our results concerning the ambiguity attitudes of the general public. Section 9 presents our results concerning the relations between our indexes and actual financial decisions. Our simple measurements can predict the decisions that our subjects made, but some of our findings deviate from the predictions of the current literature. We then suggest an explanation and directions for future research (reference dependence of ambiguity attitudes). Section 10 concludes, followed by appendices. Gilboa (1987) , Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , and Schmeidler (1989) introduced the first tractable quantitative theories of ambiguity. Their theories, and many follow-up theories, were normatively motivated (reviewed by Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon 2012) . Tversky and Kahneman (1992) introduced a descriptive theory of ambiguity, adding the empirical realism of prospect theory to the axiomatically justified models of Gilboa and Schmeidler. These models, while useful points of departure, are too general for empirically fitting data. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) introduced a specified version of prospect theory, the source method, which is tractable enough for fitting data. In a lab experiment, Abdellaoui et al. measured the entire risk and ambiguity attitudes of a sample of students, taking about a half hour per subject. We propose a method of measuring ambiguity attitudes that is considerably simpler than Abdellaoui et al.'s method, making it possible to measure the ambiguity attitude of nonacademic subjects within five minutes. Our method is based on matching probabilities, and measures only three indifferences per subject. These simple measurements can, nevertheless, predict stock market participation and private business ownership.
Prior literature

Subjective probabilities for the Ellsberg paradox after all
In our experiment, we used the classical (two-color) Ellsberg (1961) urn paradox to measure ambiguity attitudes. Ellsberg's paradox considers a known urn K and an ambiguous urn A. Urn K contains 50 yellow and 50 purple balls.
1 Urn A contains 100 yellow or purple balls in unknown proportion. The subject is asked to choose an urn, then a ball will be drawn randomly from that urn, and a prize may be awarded depending on the color of the ball drawn. Y K denotes the event of a yellow ball drawn from urn K. P K denotes the event of a purple ball drawn from urn K. That is, people prefer to gamble on the known urn rather than on the unknown urn (ambiguity aversion), regardless of the color. These preferences violate classical decision models using subjective probabilities, such as expected utility and subjective-probability-based generalizations, and imply the following contradiction.
(Here P( . ) indicates probability and the symbols P K and P A refer to purple.)
Based on this reasoning, the common conclusion has been that subjective probabilities cannot accommodate Ellsberg's paradox. Sagi (2006, 2008) showed that, surprisingly, it is still possible to use subjective probabilities for Ellsberg's paradox. We can assign a probability of 0.5 not only to Y K and P K but also
+ + to Y A and P A , but then assume more pessimistic weighting for A than for K-Eqs.
3.3 and 3.4 implicitly assumed identical weightings. The probabilities 0.5 of Y A and P A are subjective. The decision maker would adopt them as objective probabilities if he were ambiguity neutral, and so we call these subjective probabilities ambiguityneutral probabilities. Smith (1969, p. 325) pleaded for using such probabilities.
Under ambiguity aversion, the ambiguity-neutral probabilities 0.5 of events Y A and P A are underweighted relative to the objective probabilities 0.5 of events Y K and P K . Thus the above preferences in the Ellsberg paradox can still be accommodated:
for a chance to win €15, people prefer an objective probability of 0.5 to the same subjective (ambiguity-neutral) probability. Eqs. 3.3 and 3.4 hold with equality, but the preferences in Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2 still hold. Sagi's (2006, 2008) idea entails a remarkable revival of subjective probabilities for the Ellsberg paradox.
2 Sagi (2006, 2008) gave preference conditions that justify the use of subjective ambiguity-neutral probabilities. These preference conditions were empirically verified by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) , whose source method was based on
Chew and Sagi's idea. In our Ellsberg experiment the conditions of Chew and Sagi follow almost trivially from symmetry in the colors. Hence we can also use the source method.
Matching probabilities to easily measure ambiguity attitudes
The main tool for our simple measurements of ambiguity attitudes is matching probabilities, which we explain using the ambiguous events in our experiment as an example. To measure the matching probability of event Y A , we kept the ambiguous urn fixed, but changed the number of yellow balls in the known urn K. That is, urn K contained X yellow balls and (100X) purple balls. We found the number of X yellow balls in urn K that made the subject indifferent between gambling on Y A and on Y K (i.e., we found the number of yellow balls in urn K such that 15 Y K 0 ~ 15 Y A 0).
Details are in Appendix A. Then, for the ambiguous urn, the matching probability of event Y A is X/100. We also call X/100 the matching probability of the ambiguityneutral probability 0.5 of Y A , and write m(0.5) = X/100. (4.1)
Under ambiguity aversion, m(0.5)  0.5. The function, m, can depend on the source of ambiguity.
We can similarly measure m(p) for ambiguous Ellsberg-urn probabilities other than p = 0.5. In our experiment, we also considered a known urn containing 10 colors with 10 balls of each color versus an ambiguous urn containing 100 balls of 10 colors in unknown proportions. We use these urns to measure the matching probabilities m(0.1) and m(0.9). To measure m(0.1) we consider gambles in which the subject wins a prize if the randomly selected ball is of one particular color. For example, m(0.1) = 0.14 means that the subject is indifferent between gambling on one color with 14 of the 100 balls in the known urn versus gambling on one color from the ambiguous 10-color urn. This matching probability would imply ambiguity seeking, with the ambiguity-neutral probability 0.1 preferred to the objective probability 0.1.
To measure m(0.9) we consider gambles in which the subject wins a prize provided the randomly selected ball is not of one particular color. For example, m(0.9) = 0.8 means that the subject is indifferent between gambling on 80 of the 100 balls in the known urn versus gambling on nine colors from the ambiguous 10-color urn.
3
Although most current theoretical papers on ambiguity assume universal ambiguity aversion, as early as 1962 Ellsberg predicted prevailing ambiguity seeking for unlikely events, such as one color drawn from the ambiguous 10-color urn (see Ellsberg 2001 p. 203 5 Indexes of ambiguity attitudes derived from matching probabilities Jaffray (1989 Eq. 10 ) and Kahn and Sarin (1988) used the following indexes of ambiguity attitudes (AA indexes), which we term event-specific indexes. Each AA p shows the level of "local" ambiguity aversion for an Ellsberg-urn event with ambiguity-neutral probability p. We also use the following global indexes of Abdellaoui et al. (2011) , adapted to our matching probabilities (see Figure 4 .1). First, we find the best-fitting line Index a So is an anti-index of the steepness of the curve in the interior of its domain. It reflects lack of discrimination of intermediate levels of likelihood, transforming them towards 50%; i.e., it is a cognitive component (Wakker 2004) . Baillon, Cabantous, and Wakker (2012) used similar indexes for matching probabilities of midpoints of probability intervals, rather than of ambiguity-neutral (subjective) probabilities as in Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and in our study.
Decision-theoretic foundation for matching probabilities
This section is not essential for readers focused on empirical implications and willing to accept our ambiguity indexes at face value. The section is essential, however, for a decision-theoretic justification of our method.
A prospect  E  yields outcome  if event E occurs and outcome  otherwise.
Outcomes designate money and are nonnegative. E is an uncertain event, such as Y A , and the decision maker is uncertain about whether the outcome of prospect  E  will be  or . Under prospect theory, and most ambiguity theories used today, for   , the prospect is evaluated by 
(6.2) P denotes a subjective probability measure, justified by Chew and Sagi's (2006) conditions. Because these probabilities would be treated as objective probabilities by an ambiguity-neutral decision maker, we call them ambiguity-neutral. Here w So , the source function, weights the ambiguity-neutral-probabilities, and is strictly increasing between the fixed points 0 and 1. It may appear difficult to measure the function m So . Seemingly we would have to measure utility U, risky weighting w, and uncertainty weighting w So , as done by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) , to distill m So . Fortunately, the following result provides a convenient shortcut (Wakker 2010 Example 11.2.2).
THEOREM 6.1. The matching probability is the ambiguity function.  That is, the ambiguous prospect  E  is equivalent to the risky prospect  m So (E) , yielding  with objective probability m So (E) and yielding  otherwise. (See Appendix B for the proof.) The economic intuition for this result is straightforward.
Since our method involves a comparison between risky and ambiguous choices, with the same outcome in both cases, risk aversion and probability weighting for risk affect both choices in the same manner, and are thus differenced out from the comparison.
Thus we can immediately measure the ambiguity function from the matching probabilities described in §5, with no need to measure utilities or probability weighting. This observation is crucial for justifying the simple indexes introduced in the preceding section.
Experimental design
Sample and incentives
The data source for this study is a cross-section taken from the Longitudinal Internet
Study for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel, a representative household survey conducted by CentERdata at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. Web Appendix A.1 gives further details. Half of the sample had one of their choices randomly selected and played for a possible real reward of €15, whereas the other half played for hypothetical rewards only. In total, 510 subjects won a reward, and we paid €7,650 in real incentives. To ensure that the rewards were credible, our instructions explained that LISS was responsible for determining and administering the rewards using funds provided by the researchers. LISS is credible to the subjects because it has previously paid them real incentives, and has reputational concerns due to its ongoing relationship with the subjects.
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on the group that received real incentives, as prior studies have shown that preferences measured using real incentives are more reliable (Smith 1976) . 4 We further limit our sample to the subjects with complete data on financial assets. Thus, the results reported in the main text concern 675 subjects.
Stimuli in the core LISS panel and control variables added for our module
The LISS panel contains information about demographic characteristics, income, and asset ownership, summarized in Table 8 .1. We also measured stock market participation, risk aversion, trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008) , and financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011). Web Appendix A provides details regarding these questions.
Stimuli to measure ambiguity attitudes
The stimuli were mostly explained in §2, with further details provided in Appendix A.
Because the measurement of ambiguity attitudes is central to our study, we first tested our method in a pilot experiment with students. The results were satisfactory (Web Appendix B).
Stimuli to check consistency
To test the consistency of the subjects' choices, our program generated two check questions following the three measurements of matching probabilities. The check questions were generated by taking each subject's elicited matching probability from the two-color question (ambiguity-neutral probability of winning of 0.5) and increasing (decreasing) this value by 20%. Inconsistency results if a subject preferred the ambiguous prospect in the first check question, and the unambiguous prospect in the second check question. Table 8 .1 summarizes the characteristics of our sample. As stock market participation is our key dependent variable in Section 9, the table also separately summarizes the characteristics of non-participants and of the 20.4% of the subjects who do participate.
Stock market participants are, on average, wealthier, better educated, and more likely to live with a partner. Table 8 .
Ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity
Ambiguity attitudes revealed by first round choices
The table shows the frequency distribution of subjects with ambiguity averse, ambiguity seeking, and ambiguity neutral attitudes at ambiguity-neutral probabilities of 0.10, 0.50, and 0.90. See Appendix A for a detailed description of our stimuli. For example, we offer subjects the choice between a known urn (K) with 50 yellow balls and 50 purple balls, and an ambiguous urn (A) with yellow and purple balls in unknown proportions. A preference for urn K (A) reveals ambiguity aversion (ambiguity seeking) at p = 0.50. Indifference implies ambiguity neutrality. Table 8 .2 shows that ambiguity aversion is prevalent for the two ambiguous events with moderate and high likelihood. For example, 68.4% of the subjects had m(0.5) < 0.5, consistent with common findings. For the unlikely event, however, ambiguity seeking is the modal response: 48.9% had m(0.1) > 0.1, whereas only 33.8% had m(0.1) < 0.1. The latter result is consistent with experimental evidence for ainsensitivity from laboratory studies, advanced in many psychological studies (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Tversky and Fox 1995) , and recently confirmed in economic experiments with revealed preferences and real incentives (reviewed by Wakker 2010 §10.4.2) . It is, however, inconsistent with the universal ambiguity aversion commonly assumed in theoretical papers. Further, Index b = 0.13 shows ambiguity aversion and Index a = 0.40 shows ainsensitivity.
Table 8.3 Statistics of the ambiguity attitude indexes
Rows 1-3 show the matching probabilities for the three ambiguity questions (m(0.1), m(0.5), m(0.9)). Rows 4-6 show the three indexes of ambiguity attitudes based on the differences between the objective and matching probabilities: AA 0.1 (Eq. 5.1); AA 0.5 (Eq. 5.2); AA 0.9 (Eq. 5.3). The last two rows show the overall indexes of ambiguity attitudes: Index b: Eq. 5.5 (ambiguity aversion); Index a: Eq. 5.4 (a-insensitivity). 
Inconsistencies
For the first check question (matching probability m(0.5) increased by 20%), 11.9%
of the subjects chose the ambiguous urn, implying inconsistency. For the second check question (matching probability m(0.5) decreased by 20%), 35.0% chose the unambiguous urn, implying inconsistency. Such inconsistencies are commonly found even in laboratory studies with students (Harless and Camerer 1994 p.1263) .
Approximately 10% of the subjects choose "Indifferent" rather than directly contradicting their earlier choice. 5 However, overall, responses to the check questions are significantly related to earlier responses (p < 0.001; Chi-square). Variables 1-5 are defined in Table 8 .3: Index b: Eq. 5.5 (ambiguity aversion); Index a: Eq. 5.4 (a-insensitivity); AA 0.1 : Eq. 5.1; AA 0.5 : Eq. 5.2; AA 0.9 : Eq. 5.3. Variables 6-8 are defined in Table 8 .1: Risk Aversion (CRRA coefficient), Trust, and Financial Literacy. Correlations that are not significant at the 0.10 level are italicized. Table 8 .4 shows that the two ambiguity attitude indexes are positively correlated, which is not surprising if both indexes are related to irrationality (in the sense of deviating from expected utility; Smith 1969, p. 325) . Their correlation is not very strong, though, confirming that they capture different components of ambiguity attitudes. The ambiguity attitude indexes are not strongly correlated with trust or financial literacy.
Relations between ambiguity attitudes and other variables
Variable (1) b (2) a (3) AA 0.1 (4) AA 0.5 (5) AA 0.9 (1) Index b (Amb. Aversion) 1 (2) Index a (A-Insensitivity) 0
Table 8.5 Regressions for demographics predictors of ambiguity attitudes
The dependent variables are defined in Table 8 .3: index b: Eq. 5.5 (ambiguity aversion); Index a: Eq. 5.4 (a-insensitivity); AA 0.1 : Eq. 5.1; AA 0.5 : Eq. 5.2; AA 0.9 : Eq. 5.3. The independent variables are defined in Table 8 .1: Risk Aversion (CRRA coefficient), Trust, Financial Literacy, Don't Know Returns (proxy for perceived ambiguity). The education controls are five dummy variables for highest level of education achieved (base category is primary school). The regressions include constants but these are not displayed for brevity's sake. The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by household.
Index b
Index To test whether the ambiguity attitude indexes capture information that is distinct from previously studied demographic characteristics, Table 8 
Ambiguity attitudes and household portfolio choice
To investigate the validity of our measures of ambiguity attitudes and their economic importance for other sources of uncertainty, this section investigates whether they can help to explain financial decisions.
Background on the non-participation puzzle
The non-participation puzzle refers to the empirical fact that many households do not participate in the stock market, while standard portfolio choice models predict that they should, provided that the stock market has a positive risk premium. As shown by Heaton and Lucas (1997), Merton (1969) , and Samuelson (1969) , non-participation is difficult to explain with standard preferences given the historical returns on equities.
Although economic frictions, such as participation costs, may explain some non-participation, frictions cannot explain a large fraction of non-participation (Andersen and Nielsen 2011), especially among wealth households.
Several theoretical papers have shown that ambiguity aversion can plausibly explain the participation puzzle (Bossaerts et al. 2010; Cao, Wang, and Zhang 2005; Easley and O'Hara 2009) . Despite these theoretical models, there have only been a few non-experimental, empirical studies of ambiguity aversion and stock market participation (Kezdi and Willis 2009; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008) . These used answers to probabilistic questions as proxies for ambiguity aversion. Our study elicits ambiguity attitudes directly, using a measurement method that is descriptively and psychologically justified, and is based on a behaviorally founded decision model.
Predictions based on the present literature
Based on the present theoretical literature, it is natural to expect a negative relation between ambiguity aversion (our index b So ) and stock market participation (Bossaerts et al. 2010; Dow and Werlang 1992) . This relation will be stronger when agents perceive a higher level of ambiguity (Cao, Wang, and An additional assumption underlying the above predictions is that ambiguity attitudes for some sources of uncertainty (e.g., Ellsberg urns), while not identical, still are related to those of other sources (e.g., future stock returns). Finding such relations is important for the general study of ambiguity, and our paper can be interpreted as a confirmation of such relations. As we will see, ambiguity attitudes concerning the traditional Ellsberg urns, using only three measurements per individual, can predict actual decisions where the ambiguity concerns the stock market and private business ownership. To simplify interpretations, we standardize all non-binary variables and report marginal effects; i.e., the reported marginal effects show the (absolute) change in the probability of stock market participation given a one standard deviation change in the independent variable (or a change from zero to one for dummy variables). Because the 675 subjects belong to 609 distinct households, in all regressions we cluster the standard errors by household to avoid overstating significance due to withinhousehold correlations. Table 8 .3: Index a: Eq. 5.4 (a-insensitivity); index b: Eq. 5.5 (ambiguity aversion); AA 0.1 : Eq. 5.1; AA 0.5 : Eq. 5.2; AA 0.9 : Eq. 5.3. The other independent variables are defined in Table 8 .1. The regressions include constants but these are not displayed for brevity's sake. The tstatistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by household.
Ambiguity attitudes and stock market participation: results, with some deviations from predictions
(1) The results in column (1) of Table 9 .1 show:
i. The coefficient for ambiguity aversion is not significant;
ii. The coefficient for a-insensitivity is significant and has a negative relation with stock market participation.
Finding (ii) is confirmed by the results in column (3), in which we consider the three event-specific ambiguity attitude variables: non-participants are more likely to overweight low ambiguity-neutral probabilities. This result supports the arguments of Barro (2006 ), Drechsler (2011 ), Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005 , and Pan (2002), who argue that rare, low likelihood disasters have a significant effect on investment decisions.
The implied economic magnitudes of the effects of a-insensitivity are large. A change of one standard deviation in index a implies a 3.4 percentage point change in the probability of stock market participation. This is a change of 16.7% relative to the mean participation rate, and is equivalent to the economic effect of a €27,000 change in financial assets. The results in column (3) imply that a change of one standard deviation in AA 0.1 is associated with a 4.2 percentage point change in the probability of stock market participation.
Additional tests, in Appendix C, rule out a number of alternative interpretations of our findings for ambiguity attitudes. These include risk aversion, trust, optimism, education, quantitative skill, and financial literacy. 6 In unreported results, we also ran the regressions without control variables. In all cases, the significances of the ambiguity variables were maintained and were usually stronger.
Further analyses to partially explain the deviating findings: perceived ambiguity
One potential explanation for the insignificance of ambiguity aversion is that some subjects do not, or to a lesser extent, perceive future stock returns as a source of uncertainty. In our survey, we asked subjects which asset class provides the best long-term average return: stocks, bonds, savings accounts, or "Don't know". Subjects who choose the answer "Don't know" are arguably less familiar with the stock market, which will enhance the perception of ambiguity. Hence we use answers "Don't Know" as a proxy for perceived ambiguity. Details are in Web Appendix A; see question 2 there. Table 9 .2 includes interaction terms between the ambiguity attitude indexes and the dummy for "don't know returns", our proxy for perceived ambiguity. Ambiguity aversion does have a negative effect on stock market participation for subjects who perceive stock returns as highly ambiguous. 7 Subjects whose ambiguity aversion is one standard deviation above the mean and who do not know which asset class tends to give highest return over longer periods of time are 10.3 percentage points less likely to participate in the stock market. By contrast, ambiguity aversion has virtually no relation with stock market participation for subjects who chose stocks, bonds, or deposits as the asset that normally has the highest long-term return. The interaction between a-insensitivity (index a) and ambiguity perception is not significant. A-insensitivity affects the decision weights of extreme outcomes, whereas the question about asset returns is framed in terms of the general tendency of returns. Thus this question is more related to the center of the distribution (mean or median), and does not speak to the extremes. 8
Reference dependence of ambiguity attitudes as an explanation of our findings and a direction for future research
Our empirical finding for ambiguity aversion differs from common views (see §5), which predict a negative relation with stock market participation. To explain our deviating finding, we first note that measurement error is unlikely to explain our results related to ambiguity aversion for several reasons. First, our estimates of ambiguity aversion are very similar to those found in laboratory studies. Second, we find significant results for a-insensitivity, which is measured using the same set of questions. Also, the standard errors on the coefficients for ambiguity aversion and ainsensitivity in Table 9 .1 are nearly identical. Thus our results are not due to a lack of power. This is further supported by the significant interactions between ambiguity aversion and perceived ambiguity.
Our findings are best explained by reference dependence. Stock market participation typically involves both gains and losses and, hence, reference dependence is relevant. Several studies have found that reference dependence is empirically as important for ambiguity (reviewed by Wakker 2010 p. 354) as it is for risk (Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001; Kahneman 2003; Köszegi and Rabin 2006) .
Those empirical studies considered only lab data. Our field data confirm their findings.
Ambiguity aversion (or seeking) for losses has been found to deviate considerably from gains, usually even being the opposite). This reflection of ambiguity attitudes is similar to the reflection found for risk attitudes, where risk seeking rather than risk aversion prevails for losses. Reflection is one of the cornerstones of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . See the review in Wakker (2010 p.354) . Here again, ambiguity amplifies the deviations from expected utility found under risk. Because of reflection, the common and almost universally adopted measurements of ambiguity aversion (gains in the Ellsberg paradox), also adopted in our study, will be only weakly related to investment decisions. Indeed, consistent with this argument we find a relation only for the subjects who perceived ambiguity most strongly.
In contrast, a-insensitivity is not different for losses than for gains even in theory, because reflecting the overweighting of extremes leads to the same overweighting of extremes again. Reflecting ambiguity aversion, as shown in Fig. 4 .1b, leads to ambiguity seeking, but reflecting Web appendix C presents simulations based on reference-dependent prospect theory for ambiguity that explain all our findings. Hence, we suggest as a promising direction for future research the study of ambiguity attitudes for losses, and their relations to actual decisions. As yet, little is known about ambiguity attitudes for losses. As an additional test of whether ambiguity attitudes elicited for one source of uncertainty (Ellsberg urns) can explain economic choices related to a different source of uncertainty, we test the relation between the ambiguity attitudes and private business ownership. The distribution of the returns to private business ownership is highly ambiguous (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002 p. 745) . Column (1) and (2) of Table 9 .3 show the results of logit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if the subject owns equity in a private business. We find a negative relation between a-insensitivity (index a) and private business ownership. The implied magnitude is highly economically significant. For example, in column (1) a one standard deviation increase in a-insensitivity implies a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of owning private business equity, which is large given that only 6.8% of the subjects own private equity (a 36.8% change relative to the mean).
Ambiguity attitudes and private business ownership
These findings are similar to those for stock market participation in Table 9 .1, but one difference is that private business ownership is more negatively affected by the tendency to underweight highly likely ambiguous events rather than by the tendency to overweight unlikely ambiguous events (column (4) of Table 9 .3). A possible explanation is that many of the private business owners in our sample work in professions such as dentistry, law, or accounting, in which the probability of success is relatively high. Individuals may also overestimate their likelihood of success in business.
Conclusion
This paper provides a very simple method for measuring ambiguity attitudes and deriving indexes, using only three matching probabilities that can be elicited from subjects in five minutes. We provide a decision-theoretic justification for the indexes, and apply our method to a large representative sample. Besides ambiguity aversion, a-insensitivity (failing to distinguish between different levels of uncertainty) is prevalent. Thus earlier findings with students in laboratories are now confirmed in the general population. Our simple measures can predict actual stock market participation. This paper provides the first direct empirical evidence that ambiguity attitudes affect stock market participation for the general population.
The new tools of decision under ambiguity can help to explain investor behavior in financial markets, in particular the non-participation puzzle, beyond what previously identified variables can explain. A-insensitivity has a clear negative relation with participation. Ambiguity aversion has a negative relation with participation only for those subjects who perceive stock returns as highly ambiguous.
Our results support the arguments of Easley and O'Hara (2009) Appendix A. Matching probabilities for ambiguity attitudes FIGURE A.1
Question 1: Choosing Between Two Boxes with Yellow and Purple Balls
In this game you can choose between box A or box K, both containing 100 balls, which can be either yellow or purple. One ball will be drawn from the box you have chosen. You win 15 euros if a Purple ball is drawn.
For Box K you can see the exact proportion of yellow balls and purple balls below. Box A also contains yellow and purple balls, but the proportions are not shown in advance. Hence, both boxes contain 100 balls with two different colors (yellow and purple). The composition of yellow and purple balls is known (K) for box K and unknown (A) for box A.
Please select the box of your choice: A or K. If you think both boxes are equally attractive, you can select Indifferent. Following a practice question (whose results are not used in our analyses), we asked subjects three sets of questions that involved choices between an ambiguous and an unambiguous prospect. 9 The first question provided a choice between an urn containing yellow and purple balls in unknown proportions, Choice A, and an urn 9 In our instructions we avoided terms such as lottery or gamble (often used in the literature) so as to avoid undesirable connotations. We used the terms choices and options for what we call prospects in this paper. The default winning color was purple, 11 but the subject could select a different winning color in the first round of the question. This extra option served to avoid suspicion (Brewer and Fellner 1965; Pulford 2009; Zeckhauser 1986, p. S445) .
If the subject chose "Choice K", then in the next round Choice K was made less attractive by bisecting between 0% and 50%, and the subject was presented Figure   A .2.
If the subject selected Choice K, then Choice K was once again made less attractive by bisecting between 0% and 25%. If the subject selected the urn with unknown proportions of the two colors, Choice A, then Choice K was made more attractive, by bisecting between 25% and 50%. This process continued until the subject selected "Indifferent", or the subject reached the maximum number of six iterations. If after six iterations the subject had not yet chosen "Indifferent", we took the average of the lower and upper bounds. Our survey then took the subject to Question 2.
The second question was similar to the first, but now both urns contained 10 different colors of balls. The known urn, Choice K, initially had 10 balls of each of the 10 colors. The ambiguous urn, Choice U, also contained 100 balls, but with unknown proportions of the 10 colors. The subject could win a prize of €15 if the ball drawn from the urn selected (Choice A or Choice K) had the chosen color. The natural ambiguity-neutral probability of winning here was 0.1, in view of symmetry of colors. The third ambiguous event also concerned similar urns with 10 different colors of balls, but now the prize was won under 9 of the 10 colors. This event has ambiguity-neutral probability of 0.9 and its matching probability is m(0.9).
FIGURE A.2
We play the same game again, but with a different proportion of yellow and purple balls in Box K (see below). Everything else is the same.
You can choose between box A or box K, both containing 100 balls, which can be either yellow or purple. One ball will be drawn from the box you have chosen.
You win 15 euros if a Purple ball is drawn.
Please select the box of your choice: A or K. If you think both boxes are equally attractive, you can select Indifferent.
Choice A Choice K Which option do you prefer? (You win 15 euros if a Purple ball is drawn)
In sum, we considered three different ambiguous events, with ambiguity-neutral probabilities of winning of 0.5, 0.1, and 0.9, respectively. For each event, we derived matching probabilities from choices using bisection, varying the objective probability of winning, and stopping after the subject chooses "Indifferent" or after the 6 th round.
Choice U Indifferent
Choice K Although bisection takes longer, it provides more reliable data than directly asking for an indifference value (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2004) .
In the actual survey, the first, second, and third set of questions were always asked in the order just described, so as to begin with the simplest question. For expositional purposes, however, in this paper we order the variables by their ambiguity-neutral probability (first 0.1, second 0.5, and third, 0.9).
It is of course psychologically possible that subjects perceive gambling on one of two colors differently than gambling on five of ten colors. Because we feel that there was little reason to distinguish the two urns, and to keep our analysis tractable, we treat the two ambiguous urns as one source.
Subjects may answer strategically when a random incentive system is used with chained questions, as in our survey. Although it is possible that subjects did so in our bisections, it is unlikely that they were aware of it. This problem is more likely to arise with a sample of trained economic students than with a representative sample from the general population. If it had occurred, it would have increased ambiguity seeking. Subjects would have needed time to discover the chained nature of series, and an understanding of a maximum of six chained questions. Thus they would primarily become more ambiguity seeking for the last questions in our experiment, which always concerned the high likelihoods (0.9) of winning. However, here we found strong ambiguity aversion.
In our experiment we measure ambiguity attitudes using Ellsberg urns, which is a different source of uncertainty than the uncertainty about stocks. We use Ellsberg urns for several reasons. First, they are most commonly used in the literature, in a contrasting setup as in our experiment . Second, ambiguityneutral probabilities immediately result from symmetry arguments for such urns, without the need to measure ambiguity-neutral probabilities as Abdellaoui et al. (2011) had to do for natural events. It was important for our study that the measurement was as tractable as possible. Third, an additional reason for not using choices between bonds and stocks was to avoid the possibility of reverse causality, which could occur if subjects made choices in the survey that they feel are consistent with their actual portfolio choices. They might do so to avoid cognitive dissonance (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) . Finally, it is also useful to investigate relations between ambiguity attitudes towards different sources.
Appendix B. Proof
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1. Assume, for  > , that  E  ~  q , implying that q is the matching probability of event E and of ambiguity-neutral probability P(E). This implies w(m So (P(E)))U() = w(q)U() w(m So (P(E))) = w(q) m So (P(E)) = q.

Appendix C. Alternative explanations
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show a relation between the elicited ambiguity attitudes and stock market participation. A potential concern, however, is that the elicited ambiguity attitudes inadvertently measured some other concept.
C.1 Risk aversion
Although we measure ambiguity attitudes relative to risky attitudes, and the two concepts are conceptually distinct (Liu, Pan, and Wang 2005 p. 149-152) , they may still be statistically related (Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Figures 12 and 13; Bossaerts et al. 2010; Lauriola, Levin, and Hart 2007; Qiu and Weitzel 2012; our Table 8.4 ).
Including the responses for risk aversion, however, does not alter the significance of our ambiguity attitudes. Table 9 .1 shows that individuals who overweight low ambiguity-neutral probabilities have lower participation rates. This result is directionally inconsistent with the possibility that our ambiguity indexes inadvertently measure risk aversion. The interaction terms in Table 9 .2 show that, consistent with our predictions, ambiguity aversion has a negative relation with stock market participation for individuals who do not know the long-term returns of various asset classes. There is no clear reason to expect risk aversion to interact with the perceived ambiguity of stock returns (in unreported robustness tests we find insignificant results for an interaction between our risk aversion variable and the do-not-know variable).
Hence this result provides indirect evidence that the ambiguity attitude indexes do not inadvertently measure risk aversion.
It may be surprising that risk aversion had little effect in our study. One reason is that we measure pure decision-theoretic risk aversion, whereas many studies used questions specifically about stock market risk, which may create a mechanical relation (Web Appendix A.5). A second reason is that we, following common conventions in the field, measured risk aversion using gains. However, stock returns involve losses where risk attitudes can be different and even opposite to those for gains, as predicted by prospect theory. Noussair, Trautmann, and van de Kuilen (2011) used a different subsample of the LISS panel, and similarly found no relation between conventional measures of risk aversion and financial decisions. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show that trust is positively associated with stock market participation. They argue that trust and ambiguity attitudes are distinct concepts, but there is some conceptual similarity. In our results, Tables 9.1 and 9.2
C.2 Trust
show that controlling for trust does not affect our findings. Ambiguity aversion could arise if subjects assume that ambiguous situations are biased (distrust). However, this is unlikely to drive our results. First, subjects tend to overweight low likelihoods, whereas distrust would predict underweighting. Second, the correlations between trust and the ambiguity attitudes are very low. Finally, the elicitation procedure was designed to minimize any effect from distrust. We allowed subjects to choose their own winning color, and the instructions clearly stated that LISS would administer the rewards using funds provided by the researchers. Puri and Robinson (2007) show that optimistic subjects are more likely to participate in the stock market and have more favorable economic expectations. Although the LISS panel does not contain the questions used in their study, LISS does contain questions about economic expectations for a subset of our sample (347 subjects).
C.3 Optimism
None of the correlations between economic expectations and the ambiguity attitude indexes are significant. We also find that the ambiguity attitude indexes are not correlated with the responses to questions concerning depression, positive attitudes, or life satisfaction. (2), (4), and (6) include interaction terms with the "Don't Know" dummy and the ambiguity indexes. The independent variables are the same as in Table 9 .1. The subsamples are limited to Tertiary Education (only subjects who have completed some form of tertiary education), Questions Were Clear (stated that the ambiguity attitude questions were clear or very clear), and Check Questions Not Inconsistent (did not violate their earlier choices when responding to the check questions). The regressions include constants but these are not displayed for brevity's sake. The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by household. 
C.4 Education, quantitative skill, and financial literacy
The results in Table 8 .5 show that education has little explanatory power for the ambiguity indexes, suggesting that the indexes are not proxies for low quantitative skills. We found similar results in our pilot experiment on a sample of upper year university students who had already completed courses in statistics, calculus, finance, and economics. Financial Literacy, while related to stock market participation, does not eliminate the significance of ambiguity attitudes, further suggesting that quantitative skills do not explain ambiguity attitudes.
We further explore this possibility in Table C .1, by excluding subjects with low levels of education or who found the elicitation procedure confusing. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is restricted to subjects who have completed some form of tertiary education. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to subjects who, at the end of our survey module, stated that the ambiguity elicitation questions were either clear or very clear. In columns (5) and (6), the sample is restricted to subjects whose answers to the check questions did not violate their earlier choices. The results are similar to the full sample.
As a further test of whether the ambiguity attitude indexes measure a lack of sophistication or unfamiliarity with financial decision making, columns (1) and (2) of Table C .2 estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is 1 if the subject has a bank account. Presumably, subjects without a bank account are relatively unsophisticated or lack financial expertise. The pseudo R-square of 0.14 indicates that the control variables can explain a sizeable proportion of the variation in bank account ownership. However, the coefficients on the ambiguity indexes are all insignificant. Web Appendix:
http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/dkw_liss_amb_finance_webappendix.pdf
